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FIFTY WAYS TO LEAVE YOUR EMPLOYER:
RELATIVE ENFORCEMENT OF COVENANTS NOT
TO COMPETE, TRENDS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
EMPLOYEE MOBILITY POLICY
Norman D. Bishara*
Covenants not to compete (“noncompetes”) remain a controversial
tool for employers to restrict employee post-employment mobility,
particularly in an increasingly cross-jurisdictional business world. Amid
the growing attention focused on the impact of noncompetes in legal and
business academic literature, scholars have begun to use interpretations of
the strength of enforcement of these post-employment restrictions to assess
barriers to employee mobility and knowledge diffusion.
Unlike previous research, this article systematically, and with an indepth examination of both case law and legislation, gauges the relative
strength of noncompete enforcement across the United States based on
multiple factors at two periods. Accordingly, the article presents trends in
noncompete enforcement policy and evaluates these results in light of the
legal literature arguing that an interjurisdictional market for law exists.
The article concludes with an evaluation of the implications and future use
of these findings for policymakers, businesses, and employees, as well as
recommendations for additional research.
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However, the status quo on non-compete law is unacceptable, as
workers are being unnecessarily chilled out of the job market . . .
during this rough economy. Their skills and qualifications are
being wasted, and ambitious and productive workers are moving
to California, which refuses to recognize such agreements. In the
long run, this legislation is good for workers and good for
business.1
Robert S. Mantell, President, Massachusetts Employment Lawyers
Association2
I.

INTRODUCTION

Controversy surrounding the impact and use of covenants not to
compete continues to grow, while at the same time the use of these contract
clauses in the employment relationship is also on the rise. Do these
agreements have a significant impact on worker mobility? What happens
when a worker who signed one of these restrictive covenants crosses state
lines to work for a competitor? Do these contracts foster human capital
investment more than they hinder innovation? The answers to these
important questions depend on the resolution of another crucial question,
which until now has been left largely unaddressed as a comprehensive
issue: what exactly are all of the fifty states and the District of Columbia
doing with regard to enforcing these agreements, under what circumstances
will they enforce them, and, relative to other jurisdictions, how do these
state-level policies compare to each other in terms of how various
stakeholders are given preferential protections?
1. Letter from Robert S. Mantell, President, Mass. Emp’t Lawyers Ass’n, to William
Brownsberger and Lori Ehrlich, Mass. State Representatives (May 20, 2010) (on file with
author), available at http://willbrownsberger.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/noncompetelet-wbro3.pdf (endorsing An Act to Prohibit Restrictive Employment Covenants, H. 4607,
186th Sess. (Mass. 2009)).
2. The Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association (MELA, an advocacy group,
describes itself as:
[A] voluntary association of lawyers dedicated to advancing the rights of
individual employees in the workplaces of Massachusetts. MELA is affiliated
with the National Employment Lawyer’s Association. Like our national
counterpart, our purpose and goal is to protect and promote the rights of
working people through litigation and advocacy on behalf of our clients and
through the important work done by our standing committees.
THE MASSACHUSETTS EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, http://www.massnela.org (last
visited Feb. 25, 2011).
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While the debate over employment contracts that restrict employee
mobility in many jurisdictions continues to accelerate among policy
makers, business leaders, and employee advocates, there is a growing body
of legal research into the use and enforcement of the post-employment
contractual restrictions known as covenants not to compete (―non-compete
agreements,‖ or simply, ―noncompetes‖).3 This work recognizes that
variant approaches to the enforcement of these agreements across
jurisdictions holds implications for the free mobility of employees and for
employer interests in restricting the unfettered flow of human capital.4
Similarly, empirical work from non-legal business and other academic
disciplines such as finance, strategy, sociology, and business economics
has also begun to use rudimentary measures of noncompete enforcement as
an input in studies of how these agreements impact workers and
businesses.5
However, there has not been a systematic legal analysis-based
approach to rating the states in terms of the relative strength of enforcement
that takes into account the subtleties of a complete common law and
legislative analysis. Without such an organized and detailed picture it is
not possible to view the trends in enforcement across the states or have
evidence to conclude if enforcement has been increasing or decreasing over
the last decades. Despite this significant gap in the business law literature
regarding noncompetes, scholars rooted in various business disciplines
have argued that noncompetes are part of a market for law that is putting
private interests ahead of state interests6 or allowing an employer’s anticompetitive interests in noncompetes to subvert the interests of individual
employees.7
3. These agreements come in a variety of forms, such as a clause in a longer
employment contract or as separate contracts. For the purposes of this paper, these
agreements concern post-employment activities of employees and the term does not by itself
refer to restrictions on competition related to former owners or shareholders after the sale of
a business.
4. See generally Gillian Lester & Elizabeth Ryan, Choice of Law and Employee
Restrictive Covenants: An American Perspective, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 389 (2010)
(discussing choice of law and forum for U.S. noncompetition agreement enforcement).
5. Examples of such recent works are discussed in detail in Part II. See, e.g., Matt
Marx, Deborah Strumsky & Lee Fleming, Mobility, Skills, and the Michigan Non-Compete
Experiment, 55 MGMT. SCI. 875 (2009); Toby E. Stuart & Olav Sorenson, Liquidity Events
and the Distribution of Entrepreneurial Activity, 48 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 175 (2003); and Mark J.
Garmaise, Ties that Truly Bind: Non-competition Agreements, Executive Compensation and
Firm Investment, J. L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming) (Advance Access published Nov. 3,
2009, doi: 10.1093/jleo/ewp033).
6. See Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, Rules and Institutions in Developing a
Law Market: Views from the United States and Europe, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2147, 2149 (2008)
(―The second [choice-of-law] revolution replaces state interests with those of individual
parties and firms due to their ability to choose the laws that suit their needs.‖).
7. See Timothy P. Glynn, Interjurisdictional Competition in Enforcing Non-Compete
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There is, however, a gap in the basic assumptions undergirding this
research. Essentially, researchers have been using a simplistic analysis of
noncompete enforcement to cherry-pick certain states for analysis, without
adequately appreciating the subtleties of how complex and varied legal
decision-making can be and how enforcement policy evolves. Moreover,
because there has not been a complete picture of the relative strength of
enforcement across the states, there also has not been an adequate body of
research with which to challenge arguments about the use of noncompetes
in an interjurisdictional race to the bottom.
This article will build off of the existing research into the theory of
balancing individual and firm interests in noncompete enforcement8 and
pair it with a survey of the relative strength of enforcement across the
United States. The methodology used in developing a more complete
picture of noncompete enforcement trends over time incorporates the raw
data available in a state-by-state treatise alongside an original evaluation
rubric to evaluate and eventually rank state levels of enforcement. Notably,
this analysis will be made freely available to other researchers in an
electronic format. Thus, it has the potential to have an influence on future
empirical work on the impact of noncompetes that is undertaken in other
business disciplines in which evidence of noncompete enforcement is a
factor in evaluating employee mobility and the related spillovers. Once
this analysis is complete and presented, the article then evaluates previous
assumptions of increased noncompete enforcement and claims that
enforcement actions by firms in favorable jurisdictions are evidence of a
so-called market for law.
As an initial premise, the article predicts that there is significant
variation in strength of enforcement on the margins of the completed
sample of jurisdictions, but that most states will moderately enforce
noncompetes using the standard reasonableness test. This finding would
thus weaken arguments that noncompetes are evidence of a vibrant and
potentially harmful race to the bottom in states marketing their legal
regimes, ostensibly at the behest of employers. A finding that various
jurisdictions are nonetheless still evolving in their approach to noncompete
Agreements: Regulatory Risk Management and the Race to the Bottom, 65 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1381, 1422 (2008) (―As a whole, employers facing a substantial risk of employee
competition have powerful incentives to choose the applicable law and find a hospitable
judicial, rather than arbitral, forum when anticipating the need to enforce noncompetition
agreements.‖).
8. See Norman D. Bishara, Balancing Innovation from Employee Mobility with Legal
Protection for Human Capital Investment: 50 States, Public Policy, and Covenants Not to
Compete in an Information Economy, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287 (2006) (arguing
the benefits and costs of enforcement with regard to certain classes of workers can be
moderated by policymakers to the greatest benefit of positive knowledge spillovers
associated with employee mobility).
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agreement enforcement would give some support to critics of standardizing
the law at this stage and to the notion that the states are still acting as
―policy laboratories‖ on this aspect of human capital management.
Ultimately, this research will present a subtle yet authoritative view of
the development of noncompete enforcement and provide evidence of
trends in enforcement, as well as give guidance for state policymakers,
businesses, and employees when evaluating the pros and cons of
negotiating and attempting to enforce a noncompete agreement. This
normative discussion of how policymakers and businesses should apply the
implications of this research will help inform actions that will potentially
increase the benefits of enforcement and also decrease the uncertainty of a
noncompete’s effect on securing human capital investments. To be clear,
this article does not intend to finalize a full empirical model of noncompete
enforcement at this stage. Rather, it presents a previously unavailable view
of noncompete enforcement strength across all of the states and as a result
provides evidence and a useful law-based descriptive analysis of this area
of human capital law and policy. It also aims to provide a base set of data
and legal analysis to guide further research, which can use this article as a
tool to delve into the further effects of noncompetes on mobility, new
venture creation, and information spillovers.
Part II presents a background description of covenant not to compete
enforcement in the United States. Part III discusses the arguments about
the market for law among the states and the importance of better
understanding the relative strength of noncompete policy across the United
States, particularly because researchers are currently using incomplete and
unsophisticated data on noncompete enforcement. Part IV presents the
research and implications of a state-by-state evaluation of seven detailed
indicators of noncompete enforcement across the states in an initial
descriptive format. Next, Part V discusses the findings on the relative
strength of enforcement across the states within the context of arguments
that noncompete policy is part of a market for law. Part VI then addresses
the implications of this research for policymakers, firms, and individual
employees. The article concludes by evaluating the cohesiveness of
noncompete enforcement across the United States. That section also
includes a call for additional research into the impact of noncompete
enforcement on the employer-employee relationship, and the implications
for employee mobility and associated knowledge spillovers.
II.

BACKGROUND ON COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE IN THE UNITED
STATES

Covenants not to compete have been a controversial aspect of the
common law throughout their history and remain an issue of great
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contention in modern U.S. law.9 These agreements have long been viewed
with suspicion in both English and American common law over the
concern that noncompetes will impair personal freedom to earn a living and
have a negative impact, by design, on unfettered competition.10 The
controversy over the restrictive and anti-competitive contractual provisions
found in covenants not to compete is at least several hundred years old,
thus predating American common law.11
The fact that these post-employment restraints have been litigated and
the subject of legislative debate for so long might lead to a conclusion that
the interpretation of the legitimate purpose and scope of these contracts
would have by now reached a sort of thoughtful equilibrium of agreement
across the fifty states (and the District of Columbia). Much to the contrary
and to the consternation of employers and employees as business becomes
increasingly stretched across state and national borders, the enforcement of
noncompetes is an area of law that is still evolving and occasionally
unpredictable, as is perhaps the wider area of employment law and
contracts.12
State-based law in the United States governs noncompetes, as is the
case with most of the law governing the relationship between employers
and their employees, employment contracts, and thus, contractual
restrictions found in the ―law of employee mobility.‖13 This has led to a
national status quo where, as the research in this article will detail, state law
and human capital policy related to noncompetes varies such that the
enforceability of a post-employment restriction on an employee’s mobility
will be uncertain. Moreover, the increased importance of knowledge-based
business activity to employment law14 and the economic well-being of
9. For the authoritative review of the extensive history of restrictive employment
covenants, see Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV.
625 (1960).
10. Id. at 625-46.
11. See Blake, supra note 9. For another in-depth discussion of the history of
noncompetes, see Dan Messeloff, Note, Giving the Green Light to Silicon Alley Employees:
No-Compete Agreements Between Internet Companies and Employees Under New York
Law, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 711, 711-23 (2001).
12. For example, the American Law Institute’s new Restatement on Employment Law
has been under development for several years; however, the mere notion of restating the
best practices of employment law is somewhat controversial. For a brief discussion of the
controversy and the implications of this research, see infra Part V.
13. See Charles Tait Graves & James A. DiBoise, Do Strict Trade Secret and
Noncompetition Laws Obstruct Innovation?, 1 ENTREP. BUS. L. J. 323, 323 (2007) (calling
noncompete law, fiduciary duty doctrine, and trade secret law, collectively, ―the law of
employee mobility‖).
14. For a discussion of the changing role of employment law, see generally Rafael Gely
& Leonard Bierman, The Law and Economics of Employee Information Exchange in the
Knowledge Economy, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 651 (2004) (focusing on the impact of the
knowledge economy on employment law).
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states are complicated by the anti-competitive impact of noncompetes.
This unpredictability can be frustrating for all the parties involved,
particularly when departing employees relocate to other jurisdictions to
work for out-of-state competitors or start a competing enterprise of their
own. Some scholars have even concluded that overall, increased
noncompete enforcement in the United States is leading to a situation
where states are less permissive in allowing employee mobility.15
While the majority of states provide some enforcement of noncompete
agreements,16 as discussed at length below, there are only two extreme
outliers in terms of restrictions on any noncompete enforceability:
California and North Dakota. Due to the size and commercial importance
of the state, California’s legislation banning contractual restrictions on
employee mobility is well known.17 However, even with its well-settled
prohibition of noncompetes, California routinely encounters noncompetebased litigation, sometimes concerning requests to entertain postemployment restrictions originating in other states.18 As the recent
California Supreme Court case of Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP
reiterates, states have a strong public policy interest in upholding their law
related to restrictive covenants when the courts within a state are asked to
enforce restrictions contrary to that state’s well-settled policy.19
Despite some agreed-upon basic principles of how these restrictive
covenants are reviewed by most state courts, there nonetheless exists no
truly uniform approach across jurisdictions determining exactly what sorts
of factors are sufficient to support an employer’s claims for injunctive
relief. This variance among states in their enforcement of noncompete
policies can prove frustrating for both employers and employees because it
may make it difficult to predict the consequences for a departing employee

15. See Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee
Noncompete Agreements: Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy Approach, 45 AM. BUS.
L.J. 107, 122-48 (2008) (finding that a so-called ―modern approach‖ in the U.S. to covenant
not to compete enforcement shows a general trend in the common law and legislation
toward greater restrictions on employees).
16. See generally BRIAN M. MALSBERGER, ED., COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE, A STATEBY-STATE SURVEY (2008 and cum. supp. 2009). See also Garrison & Wendt, supra, note
15.
17. Other than an exception for restrictions on employment choice related to the sale of
the goodwill of a business, the California legislation is unambiguous in its prohibition of
restrictive employment covenants: ―[E]very contract by which anyone is restrained from
engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void.‖ CAL.
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2009).
18. See, e.g., Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285 (Cal. 2008) (presenting
an example of noncompete-based litigation in California); see also David R. Trossen,
Edwards and Covenants Not to Compete in California: Leave Well Enough Alone, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 539 (2009) (commenting on Edwards, 189 P.3d 285).
19. Edwards, 189 P.3d at 290.
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when he or she joins an out-of-state competitor or moves to a new
jurisdiction to start a competing business venture. Whatever consensus
exists among the enforcing states has coalesced around a reasonableness
test that balances the rights of parties to the restrictive covenant while
assessing the effect on the public interest.
The State of Massachusetts provides a typical example of how a
noncompete-enforcing state will analyze these contracts. For instance, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court in Boulanger v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc. stated
a common, broad rule of review for a challenged noncompete.20 There, the
court reiterated that ―[a] covenant not to compete is enforceable only if it is
necessary to protect a legitimate business interest, reasonably limited in
time and space, and consonant with the public interest.‖21 Moreover, the
court emphasized the importance of a case-by-case assessment, stating that
―[c]ovenants not to compete are valid if they are reasonable in light of the
facts in each case.‖22 Other enforcing states, such as New York, will more
explicitly focus on balancing the rights of the stakeholders to the contract,
in addition to the public interest.23
Courts in enforcing states are nonetheless mindful of the
anticompetitive nature of noncompetes and are careful to only allow
enforcement to protect employers from unfair competition and not all
legitimate competition.24 This sentiment recognizes the courts’ focus on
20. Boulanger v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 815 N.E.2d 572, 576-77 (Mass. 2004).
21. Id. The final element is also phrased in some jurisdictions as being ―not injurious to
the public.‖ See, e.g., Ashland Management, Inc. v. Altair Investments N.A., 869 N.Y.S.2d
465, 472 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (articulating one of the factors for reasonableness of a
covenant not to compete to be whether it ―is not injurious to the public‖ (citing BDO
Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1223 (N.Y. 1999))).
22. Boulanger, 815 N.E.2d at 577.
23. See, e.g., BDO Seidman, 712 N.E.2d at 1223. In that case, the New York Court of
Appeals stated the noncompete reasonableness test, and its application in New York, in this
way:
The modern, prevailing common-law standard of reasonableness for employee
agreements not to compete applies a three-pronged test. A restraint is
reasonable only if it: (1) is no greater than is required for the protection of the
legitimate interest of the employer, (2) does not impose undue hardship on the
employee, and (3) is not injurious to the public. A violation of any prong
renders the covenant invalid.
New York has adopted this prevailing standard of reasonableness in
determining the validity of employee agreements not to compete. ―In this
context a restrictive covenant will only be subject to specific enforcement to the
extent that it is reasonable in time and area, necessary to protect the employer’s
legitimate interests, not harmful to the general public and not unreasonably
burdensome to the employee.‖
Id. (citations omitted).
24. See, e.g., Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 268 N.E.2d 751 (N.Y. 1971) (concluding that an
oral surgeon in a rural community possessed skills that justified the contractual protection of
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what constitutes a legitimate protectable interest of a business in a given
jurisdiction.
As detailed later in this article, eighteen states, or about 35%, have
some sort of legislation discussing noncompetes. These states, such as
Oregon, have taken the step to codify this reasonableness test, providing
guidance to their courts as to how to implement the state’s noncompete
policy.25 An interesting exception to the usual assumption of equal
treatment for all categories of employees is the policy adopted by the State
of Colorado. Specifically, Colorado allows employers to require, by
contract, an employee to repay training costs for employment that lasts for
less than two years, and recognizes noncompetes for ―[e]xecutive and
management personnel and officers and employees who constitute
professional staff to executive and management personnel.‖26
III. THE ROLE OF NONCOMPETES IN CURRENT RESEARCH AND THE
MARKET FOR LAW
In recent years there has been an increase in extensive, qualitative
academic research conducted on noncompetes and their relation to
employee mobility and knowledge transfer. It is generally and logically
assumed that noncompete clauses in employment contracts are widely
utilized. However, there is not much evidence available on this point.
Despite the long-standing controversy over the proper level of noncompete
enforcement (if any), there is a lack of formalized research into the actual
enforcement trends across the jurisdictions. More research on this specific
element of human capital policy is important because it will provide
guidance to business and state policymakers who have an interest in
understanding how various states are responding to pressure to disallow or

the employer). But see BDO Seidman, 712 N.E.2d 1220 (holding that an accountant’s
services and skills were not sufficiently extraordinary to justify a prohibition of the
restrictions).
25. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(7)(a) (2007). Pursuant to this clause:
(A) Competition by the employee with the employer is limited or restrained
after termination of employment, but the restraint is limited to a period of time,
a geographic area and specified activities, all of which are reasonable in
relation to the services described in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph;
(B) The services performed by the employee pursuant to the agreement include
substantial involvement in management of the employer’s business, personal
contact with customers, knowledge of customer requirements related to the
employer’s business or knowledge of trade secrets or other proprietary
information of the employer . . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
26. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113(d) (2009).
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permit noncompetes of all types.27 This is consistent with the fact that,
despite the considerable ink spilled on the topic of noncompetes, few
empirical studies of noncompetes by legal scholars exist. To the contrary,
understandably most of the academic work in the developing area of
noncompetes-based research has tended to reflect traditional legal
analysis28 or, to a lesser extent, economically-informed theoretical analysis
of the contracting aspects of noncompetes.29
One exception is a study of the employment implications of a range of
public company filings related to top executives, which included a section
analyzing executive noncompetes. The study by Dean Stewart Schwab and
Professor Randall Thomas concluded that, at least with regard to the top
management contracts available in public filings, noncompetes are widely
used.30 The study looked at Chief Executive Officer (―CEO‖) employment
contracts from several hundred SEC filings for large U.S. public companies
and found that of 375 CEO contracts, 253 (67%) contained some sort of
non-competition clause.31 Interestingly, many of the post-employment
restrictions examined in the study could be triggered by any type of
employment termination, regardless of whether or not the termination was
initiated by the employer or employee.32
A.

Noncompetes, the Market for Law, and Assumptions about
Noncompete Agreements

The potential use of noncompete contracts and the litigation
surrounding them when disputes arise have been the subject of discussion
27. Perhaps the most high-profile state that is now in the midst of reevaluating the
propriety of its current noncompete policy is Massachusetts. See Will Brownsberger–State
Representative,
Democrat,
24th
Middlesex
District,
http://willbrownsberger.com/index.php/archives/tag/stag-non-competes (last visited August
18, 2010) (providing draft legislation, commentary, and discussions of the current debate in
Massachusetts).
28. See, e.g., Garrison & Wendt, supra note 15 (utilizing traditional modes of legal
analysis to propose a theory supporting an inevitable disclosure doctrine).
29. See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to
Compete, 10 J. LEG. STUD. 93 (1981) (exemplifying an economically-informed style of
analysis and discussing the efficiency of noncompetes in terms of human capital); Eric A.
Posner & George G. Triantis, Covenants Not to Compete from an Incomplete Contracts
Perspective (Univ. of Chi. John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Univ. of Chi. Working
Paper
Series,
Paper
No.
137,
2001),
available
at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/137.EAP_.covenants.pdf (expanding upon the
economic analysis performed by Rubin & Shedd).
30. Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO
Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
231, 234 (2006).
31. Id. at 254-57.
32. Id. at 255.
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by legal academics for some time33 and these writers have also used
economic theory to predict the optimal use of these contracts.34 An
increase of academic discussion in the research from a variety of
perspectives in the last decade is due, at least in part, to the resurgence of
interest in agglomeration economies in the high-technology sector,
specifically Silicon Valley.35 The focus on the role of the absence of
noncompete enforcement in California and the so-called high-velocity
labor market in Silicon Valley can be traced to the well-known conclusion
from Professor Ronald Gilson’s 1999 article, The Legal Infrastructure of
High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and
Covenants Not to Compete.36 Gilson argues that part of Silicon Valley’s
ultra-successful agglomeration economy as compared to other similarlyresourced areas, particularly Route 128 outside Boston, is attributable to
California’s longstanding ban on noncompetes.37
The provocative conclusion that noncompetes have a significant role
in hampering employee mobility and attendant spillovers such as
innovation and new venture creation has sparked interest among a range of
non-legal scholars. Consequently, in the last few years there have been
several published and ongoing empirical attempts to analyze the role of
covenants not to compete in employee mobility, levels of human capital
investment, or as markers of innovation and knowledge transfer, like patent
citations38 and workers moving from being employees to entrepreneurs.39
33. See, e.g., Blake, supra note 9 (analyzing how employers might utilize noncompetes
as a tool to protect against former employees’ actions that may threaten the employer’s
legitimate business interests).
34. See, e.g., Rubin & Shedd, supra note 29 (applying the general and specific human
capital dichotomy to noncompetes); see also GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (3d ed.
1993) (establishing the theory behind general and specific human capital investments);
Norman D. Bishara, Covenants Not to Compete in a Knowledge Economy: Balancing
Innovation from Employee Mobility Against Legal Protection for Human Capital
Investment, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287 (2006) (using specific and general human
capital investment theory to advocate for selective enforcement of noncompetes based on
the type of work involved as a way to increase knowledge spillovers); Posner & Triantis,
supra note 29, at 2 (utilizing a more intermediate form of economic theory: ―industryspecific human capital‖).
35. ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN
SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994) (employing an urban planning and sociological
approach to explain the Silicon Valley, California agglomeration economy’s growth and
development, and the related eclipse of the Route 128 technology cluster near Boston,
Massachusetts).
36. See, e.g., Alan Hyde, The Wealth of Shared Information: Silicon Valley’s HighVelocity Labor Market, Endogenous Economic Growth, and the Law of Trade Secrets (Sept.
1998), available at http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/~hyde/WEALTH.htm (last visited Feb. 25,
2011).
37. Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts:
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999).
38. While it does not focus on noncompetes, one influential article that uses patent
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Some of the articles directly address covenants not to compete, while
others use basic information about a jurisdiction’s ―yes‖ or ―no‖ (i.e., a ―0‖
or ―1‖ coding protocol) stance on enforcing the contracts at all.40 In
essence, this stream of research is using various measurements to ask the
basic question of whether or not noncompetes ―matter‖ for business
activity41 and more public-oriented social goods, such as innovation.42
One of the propositions of this article is that the current empirical
research in other, non-law disciplines does not utilize a full or nuanced
legal evaluation of the entire noncompete picture across the United States.
This oversight is addressed by the review of the states presented below in
Part III. However, before the scope and intent of that research can be
appreciated, it is first necessary to understand where current empirical
noncompete-based research stands and the legal analysis shortcomings of
those studies with regard to how noncompete policy across the states is
construed, and to the extent it is utilized.
For example, a 2003 study by Toby E. Stuart and Olav Sorenson,
Liquidity Events and the Geographic Distribution of Entrepreneurial
Activity, uses noncompete enforcement as a factor in determining the
geographic placement of new business ventures after a corporate
acquisition or initial public offering.43 Citing the 1996 edition of
Covenants not to Compete, a State by State Survey,44 the study draws on the
citation data to study employee mobility is Rajshree Agarwal, Martin Ganco, & Rosemarie
H. Ziedonis, Reputations for Toughness in Patent Enforcement: Implications for Knowledge
Spillovers via Inventor Mobility, 30 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1349 (2009) (finding that in the
semiconductor industry, a firm’s reputation for aggressive intellectual property rights
reduces the otherwise expected knowledge spillovers).
39. See Stuart & Sorenson, supra note 5.
40. The amount of attention focused on the normative arguments about the propriety of
noncompetes when it comes to workers’ rights and issues such as bargaining power
asymmetries has been much less visible. One example is Katherine V.W. Stone’s article,
Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership of Human Capital in the Changing
Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721 (2002) (discussing the issue of employee or employer
human capital ownership and arguing that noncompetes should be disallowed under a
worker’s rights perspective). For a discussion of the worker’s rights perspective in the
available literature, see Bishara, supra note 8, at 311-13.
41. This ongoing debate is perhaps summed up best by the title of a working paper
written by Sampsa Samila & Olav Sorenson, Non-Compete Covenants: Incentives to
Innovate or Impediments to Growth? (Working Paper, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1411172. As discussed in this section,
this is the central unresolved issue and this paper aims to improve the research addressing
this question by providing a comprehensive and nuanced legal analysis of where the
evolution of noncompete policy across the United States can been seen in the aggregate.
42. See, e.g., Graves & DiBoise, supra note 13 (considering whether noncompete laws
obstruct innovation).
43. Stuart & Sorenson, supra note 5.
44. P. JEROME RICHEY, BRIAN M. MALSBERGER, & AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE, A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (1990 & Cum. Supp. 1991).
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noncompete enforcement policies of the fifty states.45 The authors appear
to independently evaluate some of the statutes and case law covered in the
treatise, but the level of analysis and legal expertise utilized in construing
the states is unclear and their focus is on labeling some states as having
―weak-legal-regimes‖ related to noncompete enforcement.46
The Stuart and Sorenson study, as compared to others discussed
below, seems to have a relatively thorough view of the balance of
noncompetes, but is focused on measuring the founding of start-up
companies in the biotechnology industry, and thus somewhat limited in its
application. When the authors compared regions where noncompetes were
enforced (to any degree) to jurisdictions where there was what was seen as
weak noncompete enforcement, they found, ―strong evidence that interstate
variance in the enforceability of non-compete covenants in employment
contracts underlies differences in the dynamics of organizational
foundings,‖ thus supporting Gilson’s thesis with regard to certain high-tech
fields such as biotechnology.47 However, the subtleties of the variances in
enforcement across the majority of states that enforce noncompetes to some
moderate extent are not captured by the focus on ―weak-legal-regimes‖
being contrasted only with enforcement regimes. Thus, this evaluation
does not fully cover the bulk of the enforcement situations or possible
industries.
Another study focused on the lack of noncompete enforcement in
California and how that impacted employee movement. That article, Job
Hopping in Silicon Valley: Some Evidence Concerning the MicroFoundations of a High Technology Cluster, by Bruce Fallick, Charles A.
Fleischman & James B. Rebitzer, focuses on employee mobility
comparisons in high-tech regions.48 In particular, the authors set out to test
Gilson’s thesis about the role of noncompete disallowance in California’s
high-tech Silicon Valley region.49 The authors conclude that their ―finding
of a California effect on mobility lends support to Gilson’s hypothesis that
the unenforceability of noncompete agreements under California state law
enhances mobility and agglomeration economies in [Information
Technology] clusters,‖ but that the effect does not appear in other
California industry clusters.50 Thus, there is less evidence of mobility
across state lines, than within weak enforcement jurisdictions.51
45. Stuart & Sorenson, supra note 5, at 190, Table 1.1.
46. Id. at 190-91.
47. Id. at 197.
48. Bruce Fallick, Charles A. Fleischman & James B. Rebitzer, Job Hopping in Silicon
Valley: Some Evidence Concerning the Micro-Foundations of a High Technology Cluster,
88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 472 (2006).
49. Id. at 472.
50. Id. at 481.
51. Id.
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A limitation of this study is that it is focused on Silicon Valley and
computer industry mobility within California and comparisons with one
other state, Massachusetts.52 Therefore, the study does not take a national
view of noncompete enforcement or factor in the variance within the
spectrum of enforcing states. From the article it is also not clear to what
extent Massachusetts is considered a moderate or strong enforcement state.
Rather, it appears that the enforcement element of the Massachusetts
variable is coded merely as enforcing, without a deeper legally-based
understanding of the application of Massachusetts’ noncompete policy or
the implications of court rulings on the computer industry.
A third example of the recent important empirical work on
noncompetes is Matt Marx, Deborah Strumsky, and Lee Fleming’s article
entitled Mobility, Skills, and the Michigan Non-Compete Experiment.53
This study identifies a unique research opportunity, which occurred as a
result of a legislative quirk when revisions to commercial laws in Michigan
removed a long-standing prohibition on noncompetes.54 The article
―explores the impact of non-competes on interorganizational mobility by
exploiting Michigan’s apparently inadvertent 1985 reversal of its
enforcement policy as a natural experiment.‖55 This example utilizes patent
data to measure inventor mobility among firms, thus limiting the scope of
observable employees to highly-skilled workers with a patent portfolio.56
In addition, the variable of state enforcement is, as with the other studies,
essentially coded as ―enforce‖ or ―not enforce,‖ without any subtle
variation as to placing the state on the spectrum of enforcement ranging
from weak to moderate to strong.57 In this case the authors are comparing
52. Id. at 479. The authors also discuss the limitation of the available data for
extending the research to another high-tech agglomeration economy, Denver, in part due to
the employee data and uncertainty about the effects of the application of Colorado’s
exceptions to its noncompete statute. Id. at 479 n.22.
53. Marx, et al, supra note 5.
54. Id. (citing the revocation of the Michigan statute, MCL 445, and its replacement
with the Michigan Antitrust Reform Act (MARA) (1985), which did not contain a ban on
restrictive covenants in employment).
55. Id. at 875-76.
56. See id. at 876 (declaring that support for the article derives from patent data and ―by
employing a differences-in-differences method that ameliorates some of the challenges
inherent in tracking mobility of individuals.‖).
57. Only other nonenforcing states were used to contrast with Michigan, and Marx et
al., included the following states. However, according to the research discussed below in
Part III of this paper, not all of them did not enforce noncompetes for the entire period
before the 1985 Michigan enforcement change: Alaska, California, Connecticut, Minnesota,
Montana, North Dakota, Nevada, Oklahoma, Washington, and West Virginia. The time
period covered and the definition of ―nonenforcing‖ is not explicitly discussed in the paper.
Notably, this paper and the research discussed here consider California and North Dakota as
truly nonenforcing from a statutory, plain-language, definitional perspective, as well as
settled case law, with the other states relied on by Marx et al., receiving at least some level
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patent citations and mobility in Michigan to other ―nonenforcing states‖
during a particular time of nonenforcement: the 1975-2000 period of
observation.58 One advantage of this study over the others discussed here is
that Marx et al. endeavor to measure interstate mobility on workers by
tracking inventors and patent citation data across several states.
However, the article is focused on the impact of an interesting natural
experiment related to noncompete enforcement, which occurred in
Michigan only in the 1980s, and is based on patent citation data.
Therefore, the conclusions are bounded by those constraints. The fact that
states in this study are either ―enforcing‖ or ―nonenforcing‖ also highly
simplifies the important factor of the strength of enforcement within the
majority of states that do enforce to a lesser or greater extent. Nonetheless,
the research is important because it supports Gilson’s thesis of a highvelocity labor market being tied to an absence of noncompete enforcement.
This is based on observations that workers in Michigan—both in the
automobile industry and elsewhere—were less likely to move between
firms when the state’s prohibition of restrictive employment covenants
abruptly ended for a period of time.59
Another important contribution to the noncompete literature is Mark J.
Garmaise’s recent article, Ties that Truly Bind: Non-competition
Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment.60 The article
essentially takes a law and economics perspective on analyzing
noncompete agreements and concludes that noncompete enforcement
increases executive stability and holds down wages. However, while this
environment encourages human capital investment by firms in their
managers, it discourages self-investment in personal human capital by
those same employees.61
Compared to other empirical studies, Garmaise somewhat delves into
the subtleties of noncompete enforcement, also by using the Covenants not
to Compete, a State by State Survey treatise, in this case the 2004 edition.62
In order to develop a noncompete enforcement index, starting at a potential
zero score, Garmaise looked at twelve questions applied to each state in the
treatise, assigned each question a threshold and ―granted 1 point for each
question concerning which its laws lie above the threshold.‖63 He asserts,
without attribution, that ―laws governing the enforcement of
of enforcement ratings at both the 1991 and 2009 observation periods. Id. at 880.
58. Id. at 882.
59. See id. at 887 (suggesting that conclusions drawn from the model used in the paper
support the Gilson theory).
60. Garmaise, supra note 5.
61. Id. at 4 (elaborating on the notion that noncompetes discourage employees from
investing in human capital of their own).
62. Id. at 45, Table A1.
63. Id. at 46.
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noncompetition agreements are largely static . . . .‖64 Accordingly, except
for the time-limited view of three states (Texas, Louisiana, and Florida), he
relies on the 2004 edition of Covenants not to Compete, a State by State
Survey and its limited summaries to make judgments on the strength of
noncompete enforcement.
The benefit of this study is that, compared to the others that have been
mentioned, there is a finer granularity to the way enforcement is construed
along a spectrum of weak to strong enforcement. However, the
noncompete data is limited by the lack of a comprehensive approach and a
subtle legal analysis of the material, particularly an in depth review of the
case law. It also lacks a theoretical basis for the setting of thresholds and
the omission of an associated weighting option for each factor.
The five papers discussed here are known, or are becoming well
known, among academics concerned with issues of worker mobility and the
competitive advantage of firms. Yet, these articles are a representative
sample of how non-legal researchers are using noncompetes as a variable in
understanding the movement of labor and knowledge spillovers. Along
these lines, other investigations are well underway and concern finite issues
related to employee mobility, knowledge transfer, innovation, and abuse of
noncompetes to hold up employers or competitors. These include topics
such as the impact of noncompetes as a factor in the movement of highvalue employees,65 noncompetes as a factor in jurisdictionally-based
incentives or for impediments to investment,66 and the economics
perspective of the competitive or predatory nature of ―poaching‖ in a
noncompete context.67 On the whole, the doctrine of noncompete
enforcement is in a state of flux within a changing business and work

64. Id. at 15. This conclusion seems hasty in light of efforts by state policymakers to
revise noncompete laws, such as in Massachusetts. Even the observations of Marx et al.
related to the tide change in Michigan. Marx et. al, supra note 5. The results of this article,
as presented infra in Part IV, show that while major changes at the state level are relatively
rare between the snapshots of the policy status quo in 1991 and 2009, there is a trend toward
greater enforcement overall among the states.
65. Arijt Mukherjee, Mariano Selvaggi & Luis Vasconcelos, Star Wars: Exclusive
Talent and Collusive Outcomes in Labor Markets (Working Paper, 2009), available at
http://www.bus.umich.edu/Academics/Departments/BE/pdf/2009Oct9Mukgerhee.pdf.
66. See Samila & Sorenson, supra note 41, at 16 (following Stuart and Sorensen for a
marker of ―absence of non-compete enforcement‖ and Garmaise for ―weakness of noncompete enforcement,‖ thus suffering from the same blunt noncompete evaluation issues
inherent in those previous studies).
67. Jin-Hyuk Kim, Employee Poaching, Predatory Hiring, and Covenants Not to
Compete (Cornell Univ. Dept. of Econ., Working Paper, 2007), available at
https://editorialexpress.com/cgibin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=IIOC2008&paper_id=16 (discussing instances, in
light of noncompetes, in which a firm’s behavior in poaching workers from its competitors
can be either acceptable competition or a predatory act).

BISHARAFINALIZED_FIVE_UPDATED (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

FIFTY WAYS TO LEAVE YOUR EMPLOYER

5/11/2011 9:24 PM

767

environment68 and the fractious nature of the available research is
consistent with this evolution.
Each of these papers provides insights into the role and use of
noncompetes and thus each provides a glimpse into the policy and legal
implications for noncompetes in those limited circumstances. However,
most of these papers are primarily concerned with one subset of states, a
single state, or a single type of worker (e.g., inventors) and therefore do not
take a national view of the issue of noncompete enforcement policy. The
study that looks at all fifty states in a broad way on multiple parameters is
the one by Garmaise.69 However, that study, like the others, does not
provide a comprehensive, long-view picture of all the states’ policies
regarding enforcement. Accordingly, these studies are concerned with
using an overly-focused snapshot of noncompetes as a variable for specific
purpose and therefore fail to provide a U.S.-wide view of the policy.
These existing studies often rely on the use of noncompete
enforcement as a ―yes‖ or ―no‖ variable found in other studies, which in
turn have made somewhat dated assumptions about noncompete
enforcement. However, the authors of these studies have not necessarily
conducted their own research into the strength of enforcement and tend to
rely on the limited summaries provided in the leading aggregate treatise,
which was intended for a legal practitioner audience. As confirmed by the
discussion of the findings and implications below in Part IV.C., there are
only two states—California and North Dakota—that have virtual bans on
noncompetes. The other 49 jurisdictions allow some sort of enforcement,
but those states by no means have uniform approaches to the extent or type
of enforcement and under what circumstances it is allowed. Therefore, the
relatively simplistic and limited views represented in the small sample of
states and the ―all or nothing‖ coding for states to enforce or not enforce
noncompetes misses a great deal of the influential differences among the
vast majority of states that do allow noncompetes.
In addition, the issue of the relative strength of enforcement across a
significant time period and for all of the states has not appeared in the legal
literature to date. Stepping back and examining these studies as a group
from a legal scholarship perspective reveals some inconsistencies and
shortcomings of the basis for these empirical studies, as discussed

68. See Richard L. Hannah, Post-Employment Covenants in the United States: Legal
Framework and Market Behaviours, 149 INT’L LAB. REV. 107, 116 (2010) (reviewing the
use of noncompetes and the legal rules surrounding their use and concluding that ―[p]ostemployment covenants are indicative of the institutional forces that are emerging in the
twenty-first century labour market . . . [and] the behaviour of firms and workers in regard to
the post-employment constraints remains highly uncertain because it is dynamic and
evolving.‖).
69. Garmaise, supra note 5.

BISHARAFINALIZED_FIVE_UPDATED (DO NOT DELETE)

768

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

5/11/2011 9:24 PM

[Vol. 13:3

previously. Moreover, the verdict on the importance of noncompete law
and mobility policy—in terms of helping or harming business activity or
workers’ rights—and the role of noncompetes in key issues such as
mobility of all types of workers and knowledge transfer is not yet clear.
B.

Arguments for a Market for Law and Covenants not to Compete

For nearly four decades, legal scholars have discussed the notion that
there is a market for corporate law in which states, under pressure from
elites, will craft their laws to accommodate business interests in what
becomes the proverbial race to the bottom, often at the expense of other
stakeholders.70 The prime example of a jurisdiction engaging and excelling
in the market for law is the State of Delaware, where the majority of U.S.
public companies choose to incorporate and pay corporate charter taxes.71
Beyond the legal scholarship, implications of a market for law have been
recognized by non-legal business scholars who have found, for instance,
evidence of such elite lobbying with regard to state laws favoring antitakeover provisions to protect corporate management.72
One main reason a state like Delaware can influence corporate choices
through marketing its laws is the long-standing ―internal affairs doctrine‖
(―IAD‖), which allows for the relationships between corporations, their
managers, and the shareholders to be determined by the law of the state of
incorporation.73 This doctrine is in contrast to the law governing contracts,
which in the case of the choice-of-law doctrine with regard to a
noncompete, still requires the state of choice to have a significant
connection to the agreement.74 However, legal scholar Robert Daines
found that, in part because 97% of public firms incorporate in either their
home states or in Delaware, bimodal incorporation choices belie the
metaphors of a race between the states or a unified market for the law
70. See Larry E. Ribstein & Erin Ann O’Hara, Corporations and the Market for Law,
2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 661, 661-62 (2008) (noting the history of the debate that there is a
market for corporate law and, perhaps, a related ―race to the bottom‖ as popularized by
scholar William Cary in the mid-1970s).
71. Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake
in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 59 (2009) (stating that, ―[i]n matters of state
corporate law, Delaware has won–that is the consensus among scholars, commentators, and
practicing corporate lawyers‖). For a recent summary and presentation of arguments related
to the debate over the reasons for Delaware’s prominence in the market for law, see Larry E.
Ribstein, The Uncorporation and Corporate Indeterminacy, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 131
(2009).
72. See Timothy J. Vogus & Gerald F. Davis, Elite Mobilizations for Antitakeover
Legislation, 1982-1990, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND ORGANIZATION THEORY 96 (Gerald F.
Davis, Doug McAdam, W. Richard Scott & Mayer N. Zald eds., 2005).
73. Ribstein & O’Hara, supra note 70, at 662-63.
74. Id. at 662.
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offered by these fifty jurisdictions.75
In addition, as has been observed in various contexts, employees tend
to have less bargaining power than employers during contract
negotiations,76 including when arbitration and noncompetes are
concerned.77 The employer and its agents in management are repeat
players in negotiating employment and tend to have superior bargaining
power.78 Noncompetes, where they are allowed, are reviewed by courts
under an examination of the reasonableness of their terms and whether the
restrictions address the employer’s protectable interest.79 Accordingly,
these concerns of protecting employee interests have led legal scholars to
propose new approaches for the noncompete enforcement. These include
proposals for courts to take into account the employee’s diminished
bargaining power in noncompete negotiations,80 for a ―de-coupling‖ of
noncompete and trade secret law and a newly robust doctrine of inevitable
disclosure,81 and the application of the resource-based theory of the firm to
adjudicating noncompetes related to knowledge ownership disputes.82
Legal scholars have also recently addressed the possible role of

75. Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559,
1562 (2002) (―The nationwide race or market may be a heuristic for potential competition,
but it does not describe firm choices during the period studied. Thus, the dominant
metaphor of a national race between fifty states or a single market with fifty producers is
incorrect and potentially misleading.‖).
76. Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 340 (2005) (pointing out that a specific term, the arbitration
clause, is usually imposed on employees by management, and without any negotiation).
77. For a discussion of the concerns related to the poor bargaining power of low-level
employees, see generally Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration
Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U.
PA. L. REV. 379 (2006).
78. See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts and Worker Mobility: The
Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power via Standard Form Noncompetes, 2006 MICH. ST.
L REV. 963, 963–64, 977–80 (discussing management’s substantial advantages at the
formation stage of employment relationships).
79. Gillian Lester, Restrictive Covenants, Employee Training, and the Limits of
Transaction-Cost Analysis, 76 IND. L.J. 49, 54-57 (2001) (providing an economics-based
discussion of the legitimate interest and reasonableness review of challenged non-compete
agreements).
80. Kate O’Neill, Should I Stay or Should I Go?–Covenants Not to Compete in a Down
Economy–A proposal for Better Advocacy and Better Judicial Opinions, 6 HASTINGS BUS.
L.J. 83, 84 (2010) (proposing that appellate courts ―minimiz[e] the enforcement of
covenants not to compete where the assenting employee lacks significant bargaining power
while preserving employers’ abilities to enforce these covenants against employees who
enjoy such power‖).
81. Garrison & Wendt, supra note 15, at 186.
82. Norman D. Bishara & David Orozco, Using the Resource-Based Theory to
Determine Legitimacy in Covenants not to Compete, (Working Paper, 2011) (on file with
author).
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employment laws as a commodity in the market for law.83 Other work
addresses the issue of whether or not noncompete enforcement policy can
be evidence for this market. Specifically, Timothy P. Glynn has argued the
broad theme that noncompete-related state policy is also part of the market
for law in which jurisdictions race to the bottom to attract business.84
Professor Glynn perceives that states are beginning to enter a market
for employment contracts, including noncompetes and analyses the
development from both the supply (state) and demand (employer) side of
the market for noncompete policy. In his model he explains that previous
barriers to ―law-as-commodity competition . . . are neither fundamental nor
permanent, and there are signs of a changing dynamic.‖85 He reasons
further that:
Enhanced employer demand for state employment law is likely to
arise where (1) there are substantial differences between state
legal regimes, (2) these differences are significant enough to
trump employers’ other employment law concerns, and (3)
employers have some confidence that they can control forum
selection. A state that establishes an employer-friendly regime
may choose to compete for interstate and out-of-state
employment contracts when it perceives the benefits of
competition—pleasing home-state employers and enhanced
counseling and enforcement business—and has a judiciary both
able and willing to further its competitive aims. And,
importantly, a state serious about engaging in such competition
need not rely entirely on other states’ accepting the
extraterritorial application of its law. The state can attempt to
force acceptance of its law through aggressive judicial tactics, for
example, by racing to judgment.86
Thus, Glynn proceeds on the assumption that there is, indeed, ―a
substantial difference between state legal regimes‖ that allows for choice of
law arbitrage of a sort. The place of litigation and, more importantly, the
particular state law that is applied to a noncompete dispute is an important
factor in this market and the attendant race to the bottom. 87 To best
83. See, e.g., Richard A. Bales, Explaining the Spread of At-Will Employment Doctrine
as an Inter-Jurisdictional Race-to-the-Bottom of Employment Standards, 75 TENN. L. REV.
453, 464-65 (2008) (cataloging the various other areas of law in which inter-state
competition has been observed).
84. Glynn, supra note 7, at 1434-36 (discussing why employment law has largely been
absent from the market for law until recently).
85. Id. at 1385.
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 1421. As Glynn explains, this distinction is significant for firms:
From the perspective of an employer seeking to manage risk, which state’s
noncompetition law governs the enforcement of NCAs [non-competition
agreements] also matters—a lot. Individual employers have a strong incentive
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evaluate if there is, indeed, the requisite variation in state-level noncompete
enforcement policy it is crucial to have a full, nationwide understanding of
the status quo and trends related to what the fifty states are actually doing
with regard to their noncompete laws. That indispensible and complete
evaluation of the state’s relative level of enforcement is the subject of the
next section.
IV. EVIDENCE OF TRENDS IN STATE LAW OF RELATIVE ENFORCEMENT OF
NONCOMPETES
Systematically evaluating the covenant not to compete enforcement
policies of the fifty states, and the District of Columbia, is obviously a
labor-intense endeavor.
This is a particularly onerous task since
noncompete policy is an evolving area of law that is comprised of some
instances of legislation, but the implementation of enforcement primarily
falls to the state courts, with much of the common law being tied to the
facts of individual cases.
This challenge was made manageable by a long-standing treatise
series, Covenants not to Compete, A State-By-State Survey, which serves as
a central repository for periodic updates from all fifty-one jurisdictions.88
The series is published approximately every two to four years, and is
updated with comprehensive supplements in the intervening years. The
treatise is organized at the level of each jurisdiction with a portfolio of
questions, which are then answered briefly and followed with citations to
relevant authority, including state statutory law, leading cases, and
secondary sources drawn, for instance, from law review and bar journals.
For the evaluation described below, the focus was on the seven
questions from the Covenants not to Compete treatise as a way to organize
the information gathering and evaluation. In order to establish some
context with which to get a broad view of state policies and their evolution
and trends over time, a two period view of each jurisdiction was taken by
gathering data from the 1991 treatise and from the recent 2009 version.
The consistency of the data collected in the Malsberger treatise allows for
there to be an adequate level of confidence that the same factors are

to keep their employees and intellectual capital from migrating to competitors.
Indeed, at least with regard to some types of firms or categories of workers,
employers’ ex ante concerns regarding NCA enforceability against departing
employees many outweigh all other employment considerations.
Id. (citations omitted).
88. The most current edition, and supplements covering updates through 2009, is
COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE, A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (Brian M. Malsberger ed., 6th
ed. 2008 & Supp. 2009), supra note 16. The earlier version in this research is RICHEY, ET
AL., supra note 44.
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recognized over different observation periods. The gap between 1991 and
2009 also provides enough time for the law to change, if at all. One
potential issue with the space between periods is that there could be
fluctuations in a state’s policy within the period, which would not be
captured. However, ultimately the data does likely show some balance
across the time periods and evidence of trends, even if these two periods
represent snapshots of noncompete policy at those years.
In general, this data collection, as described below in detail, was
intended to capture any national trends in enforcement, such as the states
moving toward or away from the margins of stronger enforcement, over a
period of nearly two decades. It will also provide a picture of the relative
enforcement across jurisdictions and do so in a detailed way that provides
more subtle shadings than are available from other sources. The data
pinpoints the positioning of individual states and be able to show not only
if those states have adopted stronger or weaker noncompete enforcement
policies, but it will be able to show how those changes impact their ranking
among peer jurisdictions and show any geographic concentrations of
enforcement patterns. Finally, the goal of this evaluation is also to develop
more evidence than is currently available to understand the contours of
noncompete enforcement. As an additional note, all of this scoring and
summary ranking data will be made available by the author to other
interested researchers.89
A.

The Approach to Evaluating each State’s Enforcement Policy

Overall, the goal of rating the states and assigning a raw score based
on multiple common parameters was to collect evidence of the relative
enforcement across the entire United States. To accomplish this, seven
indicators that tend to indicate strong, moderate, or weak levels of
noncompete enforcement were examined. The construct of placing states
on an enforcement spectrum ranging from weak to moderate to strong
levels of enforcement was first developed in an earlier article on the role of
noncompetes in employee mobility in a knowledge economy.90 The
typology is used again here as a way to show variance and potential trends
as state-level policies evolve over time.
The advantage to this study over the ones discussed above in Part III is
that this data collection was conducted from a legal researcher’s
perspective with the intent to provide a subtle, yet deep, analysis of the
89. Because this data includes an element of assigning weights to influence the ranking
based on the importance of the question to the dependent variable of strength of
enforcement, the data can easily be utilized to highlight other outcomes by adjusting the
emphasis and rationale for the weight factors.
90. See Bishara, supra note 8.

BISHARAFINALIZED_FIVE_UPDATED (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

FIFTY WAYS TO LEAVE YOUR EMPLOYER

5/11/2011 9:24 PM

773

legal importance of various ligation outcomes as provided by a variety of
statutory and case law. Part of the premise of this approach is that a
business lawyer’s view of the importance of how courts apply rules and the
nuances of how they enforce a stated policy from the legislature—or,
alternatively, how in the aggregate a state’s courts will develop its own
policy—can add value that is not available in the extant noncompete
literature. For instance, even though most states employ a reasonableness
test to evaluate the contract, the approach, tools, and principles used by
each court varies materially within the reasonableness structure. In other
words, what one set of state courts deem a reasonable restriction on the
employee’s activities may indeed vary significantly from a court’s
application of the same standard in another jurisdiction. States also vary in
what they consider a protectable interest, thereby having a more or less
expansive view of what is reasonable for employer’s to restrict. Moreover,
the extent to which a court tries to accommodate a request to enforce a
noncompete through mechanisms such as modifying the terms of the
contract or otherwise granting partial enforcement is indicative of the
strength of enforcement.
Within these nuances and constraints, a researcher trained in the law
can better gauge the importance and tone of the numerous opinions
generated by the courts of a given state. To that end, the seven questions
listed and discussed below were chosen because they directly address the
legal issues relevant to measuring a given jurisdiction’s intensity of
noncompete enforcement. These questions are the ones applied in the
Covenants not to Compete treatise, and thus are applied consistently to
each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia. While these questions
are not necessarily geared toward the extent of enforceability within each
jurisdiction, these questions, in the aggregate, can flesh out a full picture of
a state’s policy on noncompetes, including if the state has contemplated its
policy to the extent that it has enacted legislation on the topic. Thus, the
questions listed below are categories drawn from the Covenants not to
Compete treatise and are useful benchmarks for a state’s policy during the
1991 and 2009 time periods.
“Question 1: Is there a state statute of general application that governs the
enforceability of covenants not to compete?”
For this question, a score of 10 was awarded to a state that has a
statute that favors strong enforcement, a 5 was awarded to a state that either
did not have a statute or had a statute that was neutral in its approach to
enforcement and a 0 was given to a state that has a statute that disfavors
enforcement. This question was given an overall weight of ten. It is
important to note that the available statutes addressing noncompetes vary
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widely and range from encouraging enforcement or segmenting applicable
categories of workers to banning enforcement of post-employment
restrictions.
In this instance, the availability of a statute was considered a strong
indication the state had considered and weighed the policy options and
effects related to crafting a noncompete policy. The content of the statute
was the most important factor in determining the state’s score. For
instance, statutes that merely restated the common law reasonableness
standard received a score of 5. If a state did not have a noncompete–
specific statute passed into law, then it was considered a neutral indicator.
Two states, California and North Dakota, have consistently had what can
be described as ―anti-noncompete‖ statutes, which is consistent with their
public policy stance of not restricting worker mobility. Several states have
statutes related to disallowing contracts in restraint of trade. However,
reasonable noncompete agreements, sometimes with specific carve outs
detailed, are a common exception to such legislation.
“Question 2: What is an employer’s protectable interest and how is that
defined?”
When evaluating the important issue of a state’s recognition of what
employer interests are ―protectable‖ with a noncompete, a score of 10 was
awarded to a state that has a broadly defined protectable interest. A score
of 5 was awarded to a state that has a balanced approach to defining a
protectable interest and a 0 was awarded to a state that has a strictly defined
limited protectable interest for the employer.
This question was given an overall weight of 10 in recognition that the
element of protectable interest is a key factor in noncompete-based
litigation. This issue gets to the heart of a state’s policy choices in that
states, normally through the common law decisions, essentially sketch the
parameters of the employer’s rights. In that sense, the tradeoff between the
rights of the employee to evade the contract and a court opinion allowing
enforcement on the grounds of protecting an employer’s knowledge-based
property rights is a zero-sum game. Put another way, this question also
helps establish what a state’s policymakers see as the permissible
boundaries of employer protections and where the line is crossed into
employer overreaching at the expense of the employee. In practical terms,
states with enforcement policies that mimic existing trade secret and duty
of loyalty protections for employers received lower ratings, while,
cumulatively, protections for confidential information, developed customer
lists, firm good will, nonsolicitation of fellow employees (known as
poaching or raiding), customer contacts, customer goodwill, and for a
firm’s investment in training the employee, would increase a state’s

BISHARAFINALIZED_FIVE_UPDATED (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

FIFTY WAYS TO LEAVE YOUR EMPLOYER

5/11/2011 9:24 PM

775

rating.91
“Question 3: What must plaintiff be able to show to prove the existence of
an enforceable covenant not to compete?”
Regarding this question, a score of 10 was awarded to a state that
places a weak burden of proof on the plaintiff employer, a 5 was awarded
to a state that has a balanced approach to the burden placed on the
employer and a 0 was awarded to a state that places a strong burden of
proof on the employer. This question was given an overall weight of 5.
The assumption related to strength of enforcement with this question
was that the state’s noncompete-specific contract law decisions would
reflect a state’s interest in protecting an employer over employees (or vice
versa), based on the ease with which either party can make a showing to
carry their burden of proof. In application at the state level, this question
tended to concern broader issues of a state’s common law on contract
litigation and not strictly noncompete disputes and thus was weighted by a
factor of 5 and not 10.
“Question 3a: Does the signing of a covenant not to compete at the
inception of the employment relationship provide sufficient consideration
to support the covenant?”
When evaluating this question as an independent data point, the
highest score of 10 was awarded to a state where the start of employment is
always sufficient to support a covenant not to compete, a score of around 5
was awarded to a state where the start of employment is sometimes
sufficient to support a covenant not to complete and a 0 would be awarded
to a state where the start of employment is never sufficient consideration to
support a covenant not to compete. This question was given an overall
weight of 10.
With the issue covered by this question, the basis for the rating and
ranking scheme is related to an assumption that a state that requires
independent consideration to support the non-compete agreement is
expressing a pro-employee sentiment, which tends away from strong
enforcement. On the other end of the rating spectrum, if an employer need
not provide any independent consideration other than the other terms of
employment (or even the promise to employ, even at-will employment),
then the state is expressing an employer-friendly, pro-noncompete
enforcement stance.
91. These protectable interests tend to indicate that a state has a stronger level of
enforcement and, consequently, is inclined to protect an employer’s interests over those of
the departing employee. See Bishara, supra note 8, at 315, Figure 1A.
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“Question 3b & 3c: Will a change in the terms and conditions of
employment provide sufficient consideration to support a covenant not to
compete entered into after the employment relationship has begun? Will
continued employment provide sufficient consideration to support a
covenant not to compete entered into after the employment relationship has
begun?”
For this combined question with subparts, a score of 10 or near ten
was awarded to a state where continued employment is always sufficient to
support a covenant not to compete, a median score of around 5 was
awarded to a state where only a beneficial change in terms was sufficient to
support a covenant not to compete, and a 0 was awarded to a state where
neither continued employment nor a beneficial change in terms would be
sufficient consideration. These questions were combined and together
given an overall weight of 5 to reflect the modest impact this issue would
likely have in policymakers’ views of the strength of enforcement of
noncompetes in a given jurisdiction.
These complementary questions get at the state’s enforcement policy,
like question 3a, because they evidence state’s willingness to favor
employers or employees in formality with which the requirement
consideration is treated. Where an employer is required to present
additional consideration to support a noncompete, the policy is more
employee-friendly and represents weaker enforcement sensibilities. If the
employee can be made to sign a noncompete agreement after employment
has commenced and no new consideration is provided, then the policy
trends toward strong enforcement would be reflected in the state’s rating.
“Question 4: If the restrictions in the covenant not to compete are
unenforceable because they are overbroad, are the courts permitted to
modify the covenant to make the restrictions more narrow and to make the
covenant enforceable? If so, under what circumstances will the courts
allow reduction and what form of reduction will the courts permit?”
Here a possible high score of 10 was awarded to a state where judicial
modification is allowed and there are broad circumstances where revisions
can be made and limited restrictions on maximum enforcement. A midrange score of 5 was awarded to a state where so-called ―blue pencil‖
modifications were allowed as a way to reform the contract instead of
disallowing it outright. This indicates that there was a balanced approach
to the allowable scope of restrictions and to accommodating the plaintiff’s
enforcement request. A low score, possibly as low as a 0, was awarded to a
state where neither ―blue pencil‖ nor judicial modification was allowed.
This question was given an overall weight of 10 to reflect the fact that
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answers to this question are reflective of a state’s overall commitment to
affirmatively pursuing the intent of the parties in reaching the original
agreement underlying the restrictive covenant.
Like some previous questions, Question 4 is related to a jurisdiction’s
general law of contract interpretation. However, the nature of the
geographic and time restrictions inherent in non-compete clauses makes
this a particularly salient issue for gauging the strength of a state’s policy
toward enforcement. Depending on the broadness of the scope, if courts
will rewrite the contract to make the terms reasonable, then the rating
would be higher and with a score at or near 10. This is based on an
assumption that a policy of amending contract terms on these parameters is
evidence of strong enforcement because this act preserves the employer’s
protectable interests. Moreover, a policy allowing the court to ―blue
pencil‖ noncompete terms gives employers more latitude to push
boundaries or overreach with less fear that the entire agreement will be
unenforceable.
“Question 8: If the employer terminates the employment relationship, is the
covenant enforceable?”
When evaluating this question, a high score of 10 was awarded to a
state where a covenant is always enforceable if the employer terminates, a
score of 5 was given to a state where a covenant is enforceable only in
some circumstances, and a score of 0 was given to state where a covenant
is not enforceable if the employer terminates. This question was given an
overall weight of 10.
Like Question 4 above, an affirmative answer to this question
indicates a strong policy in favor of enforcement in that the employer is
given more deference than the employee, perhaps at great disadvantage to
the individual’s mobility and ability to engage in their chosen livelihood.
For example, a state that allows an employer to fire or lay off an employee
and still enforce the post-employment restrictions receives a high score
indicating a policy of strong enforcement. Other jurisdictions which
essentially disallow enforcement if the employer initiates the discharge
would be taking an employee-friendly position and, in effect, displaying a
policy of weak-enforcement.92

92. Also of note is the fact that, as compared to the other questions, Question 8 and the
issue it covers was the question that was most often not previously addressed by a state and
its policymakers. This fact is interesting because it would seem to indicate that this is an
area where states can both decisively demonstrate a strong or weak approach to
enforcement, and because it represents one of the few areas that has not been touched by
what is normally an extensive body of common law.
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Descriptive Analysis and Implications

After all of the states were rated on each of the seven questions for
what the status quo was of noncompete enforcement at the 1991 and 2009
time periods, the data was weighted, and a ranking for each state during the
relevant time period was calculated.93 States with a low numerical ranking
are considered to have the strongest noncompete policy regime. In both
cases, Florida ranked as the jurisdiction with the strongest enforcement
laws and attendant policy. On the other end of the enforcement spectrum,
in both 1991 and 2009 North Dakota and California—the states with the
anti-noncompete enforcement statutes without exceptions for any postemployment restrictions—ranked fifty-one and fifty, respectively. A table
summarizing these rankings and a calculation of each state’s net positive or
negative change in ranking is provided in Figure 1, Strength of
Enforcement Ranking Change (1991-2009).
A review of the rankings and the overall data for the most recent 2009
observation reveals that eighteen states (approximately 35%) have
noncompete legislation of some sort. To get a sense of the distribution of
the raw scores in relation to the rank of each state Figure 2, Strength of
Enforcement Ranking (2009) with Relative Distribution Highlighted,
visually shows the distribution using a color scheme (green for a fully
strong noncompete enforcement policy, shades of yellow for moderate
enforcement, and red for little or no enforcement).
From the 2009 ranking data, forty-nine states (96%) and the District of
Columbia allow some sort of noncompete enforcement. Within that broad
range of enforcing states, twelve states (20%) strongly enforce
noncompetes (based on a range of ―strong‖ raw scores from 410 to 470,
with New Mexico at a raw score of 410 through Florida at a raw score of
470). At the bottom of the rankings, North Dakota received a raw score of
zero and California received a raw score of thirty-one.
If the nine states (18%) at the bottom of the rankings that are generally
weak enforcing states are excluded, the remaining thirty middle-ranked
states (60%) are moderately enforcing jurisdictions. This indicates that
despite some clustering on the margins, most jurisdictions fall into the
moderate enforcing category. Nonetheless, even the majority of the nine
bottom-ranked states still have some level of enforcement in certain
situations, which reinforces the fact that the vast majority of states allow
post-employment noncompetes of some kind. In other words, the majority
of states have a noncompete enforcement policy that places at a relatively
93. The raw ratings data will be made freely available electronically. Thus, the weights
assigned to the various categories of enforcement indicators, while chosen carefully for this
paper, can easily be modified by other researchers to hone in on specific research questions
and variables.
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moderate level among the other jurisdictions.
Another graph, Figure 3, Strength of Enforcement Ranking,
Comparison of Change (1991-2009), provides a side-by-side view of the
changes in state rankings from 1991 to 2009. Many of the states, as shown
in other figures, retained the same basic range of rank at both time periods.
However, there are a few notable outliers that have indicated significant
changes in their level of noncompete enforcement policy. For instance,
Georgia moved thirty spots toward California (i.e., less enforcement) while
Louisiana saw a near opposite change in rank of twenty-nine spots toward
more enforcement.
Other notable changes in state’s rankings between 1991 and 2009 are
found in the states of Idaho (moved to five from twenty-eight), Vermont
(moved to fifteen from thirty-five), Iowa (moved to seven from twentytwo), and Massachusetts (moved to eighteen from seven). These outliers
and their direction of change can also be seen in the scatter plot graphs of
Figure 4, 1991 rank score against 2009 rank score, and Figure 5, 1991 raw
scores against 2009 raw scores. Both Figure 4 and Figure 5 also show that
overall the scores are generally higher in 2009 than 1991, providing
evidence of a general drift toward more enforcement in the United States in
the aggregate. This is, perhaps, due to the greater formalization of
noncompete policy in the states and a growing collection of observable
cases of noncompete litigation.
Figures 6 through 12 show the frequency of scores across each of the
seven individual noncompete-related questions that were drawn during data
collection. Noteworthy is that while some of the graphs show high
instances of median-level scores, Question 4 (see Figure 11) (allowing the
―blue pencil‖ modification of terms) and, in particular, Question 8 (see
Figure 12) (if the circumstances of the employee’s departures impacts
enforcement) show that there are important indicators of a state’s
enforcement policy that are not yet even addressed by many states.
To get another view of the ranking and strength of enforcement data
that provides a spatial, geography-based view of the distribution of
enforcement, the enforcement ―heat‖ mapping of weak-to-moderate-tostrong levels of enforcement was added to a map of the United States. The
maps in Figure 13 (1991) and Figure 14 (2009) provide a visual sense of
where states rank with regard to their geographic neighbors. Interestingly,
based on a plain review of the maps there appears to be no dramatic
geographic groupings of states with similar levels of enforcement. The
maps also provide a view of the snapshot of each period that, when
compared, does not provide evidence of dramatic change over the eighteenyear period. Also noteworthy is that the maps do not provide support for
any anecdotal sense from legal practitioners that noncompete enforcement
necessarily weakens west of the Mississippi River.
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APPLYING THE IMPLICATIONS TO ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT
NONCOMPETES AND A MARKET FOR LAW

Based on the findings and implications presented in the previous
section, what insight does this research provide into assumptions about
noncompetes and about arguments about the growing role of noncompetes
in a market for law? Initially, there are some interesting outlier states that
experience drastic changes in one direction (particularly Louisiana and
Georgia), but most states remain generally in the same range of
enforcement (i.e., a moderate range) after the eighteen-year period.
However, there is a measurable drift of the aggregate policies in the
United States toward greater enforcement. This trend gives some support
to Professor Glynn’s thesis that states will enter a market for law that will
have participating jurisdictions rendering employer-favorable rulings for
the cases they do choose to adjudicate. This is also consistent with
conclusions reached by Professors Garrison and Wendt about the general
increase in enforcement across the United States.
Nonetheless, the states that do not enforce or have rather weak
enforcement are very much in the minority. The states that have aggressive
pro-enforcement policies and laws favoring noncompetes are also on the
margins. Thus, the majority of states have followed a moderate course that
seems to comport with traditional noncompete aesthetics of moderation
through narrowly tailored and balanced—and reasonable—protectable
interests that foster business investments in workers’ human capital. In this
sense, Professor Glynn’s assertion that a prerequisite to ―[e]nhanced
employer demand for state employment law‖ will arise when ―there are
substantial differences in state legal regimes‖ may still be accurate, if not
occurring at this time.94 However, while there is some variance among
states on the margins, this research does not provide support for an
assertion that there is currently a movement toward significant differences
among many jurisdictions. In support of this conclusion is an observation
that while a small handful of states have adopted industry-specific
noncompete policies to address noncompetes for on-air broadcasters, these
have not proliferated, nor have other industries successfully lobbied for
noncompete law exceptions to benefit their narrow interests.95
Yet Glynn’s insights about the place of noncompetes in a market for
law are not without merit in the sense that he predicts this shift will
continue and that some states, like Delaware, may have the leverage to

94. Glynn, supra note 7, at 1385.
95. See Melissa Ilyse Rassas, Explaining the Outlier: Oregon’s new Non-Compete
Agreement Law and the Broadcasting Industry, 11 U. PENN J. BUS. L. 447 (2009)
(illustrating an example of a recent broadcaster-focused noncompete policy regime).
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exploit a market for noncompetes if they chose to do so.96 The results of
the study described herein do not support the sort of polarization or drastic
changes that might mark a race to the bottom toward either end of the
enforcement spectrum. In any event, the trend for some states to adopt
brand new or revised statutes addressing subtleties of enforcement, such as
limiting the permissible scope of covered employees based on salary floors,
is evidence that the law of noncompete enforcement is very much being
debated and refined by the states. The point is that at this moment and
since the early 1990s, there is not convincing evidence in this research of a
sea change in the manner in which states interact with business interests in
a race to the bottom. Evidence for that dramatic trend would be present if,
for instance, this research revealed that many states were noticeably
increasing the strength of their enforcement or if numerous legislative
changes were made to reflect industry lobbying efforts.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS, BUSINESS, AND INDIVIDUAL
EMPLOYEES
Despite repeated calls for the abandonment of any sort of noncompete
enforcement from some quarters, the data shows that most states enforce
noncompetes and that they are not becoming more California-like in their
approach. In fact, the opposite is somewhat true because in the aggregate
enforcement is increasing across the country. In light of the research
presented above and conclusions about the state of noncompete
enforcement across the United States, the next issue to address is what
policymakers, the courts, businesses, and employees should do with these
conclusions. Also, what other research is needed on this topic?
A.

Recommendations for Policymakers

For the state legislatures and the courts it seems that there is indeed
room to both develop more thoughtful, modern policies and to differentiate
their states from other peer jurisdictions. If, indeed, a state chooses to
consciously modify its current approach to enforcement and enter a race to
attract business based on its noncompete policy, this research provides a
new dimension of information to show a state where it stands in relation to
states it wants to emulate or to avoid. In other words, these findings will
assist a state by letting it know where it ranks, thereby giving it some
needed context to determine where it stands in relation to other states,
based on industry, geography, or a business development ambition, instead
96. See Glynn, supra note 7, at 1432 (arguing that Delaware is ―well positioned‖ to
engage in competition for ―NCA business,‖ as are potentially other states such as New
York).
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of having a haphazard approach to a potential race to the bottom.
In that sense, the fact that this research fills a void in the literature by
providing a comprehensive comparison across states is crucial to
jurisdictions that are examining their policies on knowledge spillovers and
employee mobility—and potential alternatives to noncompetes. Even
where noncompetes are not an issue because they are disallowed, as in
Silicon Valley, firms come up with workaround solutions to address fears
that their competitors will learn by hiring away their top talent97 or other
ways to mimic noncompetes.98 Accordingly, a state legislature is wise to
proactively address these alternatives head on.
Another group of important and influential employment law
policymakers that will find this research useful is the drafters and
opponents of the Restatement of Employment Law (3rd), which is currently
under revision and discussion by members of the American Law Institute
(―ALI‖). For several years, legal scholars in employment law have
critiqued the approach and even the mere idea of a new Restatement of
Employment Law.99 Perhaps the apogee of this criticism arrived with a
motion at the ALI’s 2008 national meeting on behalf of the Labor Law
Trust Group to stop the Restatement development process. That motion
was made alongside an open letter signed by 66 leading employment and
labor law professors indicating that they do not support the endeavor and to
―strongly urge‖ the ALI ―to terminate this project.‖100 In sum, the
97. See, e.g., Miguel Helft, Unwritten Code Rules Silicon Valley Hiring, N.Y. TIMES,
July 3, 2009, at B11 (reporting on a U.S. Department of Justice antitrust investigation into
Silicon Valley firms such as Apple, Microsoft, Google, Genentech, Intel, and Yahoo related
to evidence that firms have unwritten agreements not to pursue employees at other firms,
particularly partner firms).
98. Commentators are also arguing for alternatives to covenants not to compete, such as
Garden Leave and training cost repayment from the new employer, as a way of addressing
the employer, employee, and innovation concerns over labor mobility and human capital
investment. See, e.g., Brandon S. Long, Note, Protecting Employer Investment in Training:
Noncompetes vs. Repayment Agreements, 54 DUKE L. J. 1295 (2005) (arguing that
repayment agreements are sensible alternatives to traditional noncompetes because such
agreements offer employers protection in lockstep with the cost of the actual training).
99. See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Response to Working Group on Chapter 2 of the
Proposed Restatement of Employment Law: Putting the Restatement in its Place, 13 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 143, 146 (2009) (citations omitted) (―What we have seen is a widely
documented trend toward short term employment, the rise of contingent labor, the rollback
of employer sponsored health plans and benefits, a reversion to external labor market
practices, and, more recently, the most significant economic downturn since the Great
Depression‖). See also Matthew W. Finkin, Second Thoughts on a Restatement of
Employment Law, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 279, 280 (2005) (doubting that a Restatement
of Employment Law would have the ability to clarify existing employment nor successfully
push for genuine law reform).
100. Letter and Petition from The Labor Trust Group to the Council of the American
Law Institute, at 3 (May 15, 2008) (on file with author), available at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2008/05/ali-and-the-pen.html.
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opposition stems from a belief, ―that the velocity and direction of legal
change in the employment relationship is incapable of being addressed by a
Restatement; that the Restatement method, if it proves influential (as the
Institute would surely wish it to be), will stultify legal experimentation and
growth.‖101
The research in this article presents a new and detailed picture of
noncompete enforcement across the states, which is an issue that is of key
importance to the employment relationship at the heart of the Restatement
controversy. Accordingly, the study’s conclusion that states are still
exploring and honing their approach to the nationally important issue of
noncompete enforcement gives credence to the opposition’s criticism that
experimentation in at least this area of employment law is alive and well at
the state level.
B.

Recommendations for Future Research

While the implications herein are useful to help dispel certain
assumptions about modern noncompete policy across the United States in
terms of trends and where states rank, the conclusions also raise other
questions worthy of further investigation. For instance, follow-on
empirical work based on these initial descriptive statistics is welcome and
could feature the inclusion of several other variables related to issues of
industry, worker education, salary, and access to knowledge that, combined
with information about enforcement distribution, will develop a picture of
mobility among certain types of workers. A missing component of the
existing noncompete research is statistical information on the actual
number of these agreements in place at various times within defined
industries and jurisdictions. Unfortunately, this is not easily obtainable
because most noncompetes are not publicly reported or catalogued. This
information would be a useful way to see trends and concretely gauge the
use of noncompetes. Along those lines, once the depth of the use of
noncompetes is clearer, then it is possible to make a more comprehensive
evaluation about the propriety of these contracts when used for certain
types of workers or specific industries.
This understanding would be ultimately useful in that it will better
inform policymakers who, like those in states which are proposing
graduated enforcement of noncompetes based on an employee’s wages, are
still experimenting with new policies. More research is also needed to
determine the extent of how the strength of enforcement impedes otherwise
socially beneficial knowledge spillovers. A related issue that warrants
exploration is the extent to which variances in noncompete enforcement
101. Id. at 2.
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among the states drives labor flows related to a market for law and if those
differences actually foster employer abuse and overreaching at the expense
of employees.
C.

Recommendations for Business and Employees

The issue of the strength of noncompete enforcement of a specific
jurisdiction implicates both employees and employers, but tends to do so in
opposite ways. In the case of these implications concerning noncompete
enforcement, it will impact the ability of employees and employers to
predict the likelihood that mobility will be hindered in a certain state. It
will also provide both constituencies with more information about the value
of bargaining for choice of law and forum provisions during contract
negotiations.
The national picture of noncompete enforcement also allows these
groups to better recognize the limitations of non-compete contracts,
particularly in light of the strength of various jurisdictions when one party
has the initial opportunity to trigger the legal coverage of a state favorable
to their litigation goals. For business, the implications of this study will
clearly illustrate the state of play of noncompete enforcement and thus
increase the likelihood that a firm will effectively consider noncompete
policy implications in making strategic human capital-related decisions.102
For example, this research can better inform a firm about where and when
to use covenants not to compete and where and when to use other legal and
business mechanisms to accomplish similar business goals.103
VII. CONCLUSION
Beyond the legal research on noncompetes and the market for law
phenomenon, there is an intuitively derived understanding of a market for
noncompete policies, albeit one not clearly based on documented
102. This increased awareness that legal strategy matters for strategic management and
for sustaining competitive advantage is consistent with trends in the management and legal
studies literature. See, e.g., Constance E. Bagley, Winning Legally: The Value of Legal
Astuteness, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 378 (2008) (detailing managers’ abilities to use business
laws to craft efficient market strategies); David Orozco, Legal Knowledge as an Intellectual
Property Management Resource, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 687 (discussing the value of legal
knowledge as a foundation for strategic behavior).
103. For the legal practitioner’s perspective and related advice on the proper use of
noncompetes by employers, see Robert B. Gordon, Analysis and Perspective: Advice for
Employers in Using Noncompete Agreements to Retain Employees, 78 U.S. L. WK. 2231
(Oct. 27, 2009). ―In short, the best noncompete is the one that can be successfully enforced;
and that means drafting them to close the most commonly claimed loopholes. . . . [and] [t]he
best strategy for talent retention is the one that motivates an employee with rewards if he
stays, not the one that threatens him with legal risks if he leaves.‖ Id. at 2231-32.
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evidence.104 However, based on the evidence discussed above, it is not at
all clear that states have yet to fully appreciate the potential gains from
marketing their noncompete laws or to engage in the feared race to the
bottom that would be a feature of a true market for law.
The implications for law and business discussed in this article will
help address gaps in the literature about the relative enforcement of
noncompete agreements and provide much needed additional context to
policymakers, as well as employers and employees, about the trends in the
market for employment law and the status of noncompete policy.
Moreover, future researchers will now have a more well-crafted and
detailed tool with which to evaluate the role of noncompetes in crucial and
evolving areas of law and policy such as trade secret protection, the
preservation of goodwill, and the impact of employee mobility across state
boundaries.

104. For example, see the passionately argued concerns about job loss to non-enforcing
states as voiced by state-level employee advocates such as Mantell, supra note 1, and
accompanying text.
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APPENDIX OF TABLES AND FIGURES
Fig. 1. Strength of Enforcement Ranking Change (1991-2009)
(1=strongest; 51=weakest)
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1991
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Rank

Change in
Rank
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Fig. 2. Strength of Enforcement Ranking (2009) with Relative Distribution
Highlighted (1 = strongest; 51 = weakest)
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Fig. 3. Strength of Enforcement Ranking, Comparison of Change (19912009) (1=strongest; 51=weakest)
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Fig.4. 1991 rank score plotted against 2009 rank.
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Fig. 5. 1991 raw score plotted against 2009 raw score.
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Fig. 6. Question 1 Frequency Distribution of the Number of States with
Each Ratings
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Fig. 7. Question 2 Frequency Distribution of the Number of States with
Each Ratings
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Fig. 8. Question 3 Frequency Distribution of the Number of States with
Each Ratings
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Fig. 9. Question 3(a) Frequency Distribution of the Number of States with
Each Ratings
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Fig. 10. Question 3(b)/3(c) Frequency Distribution of the Number of States
with Each Ratings
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Fig. 11. Question 4 Frequency Distribution of the Number of States with
Each Ratings
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Fig. 12. Question 8 Frequency Distribution of the Number of States with
Each Ratings
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Fig.13. 1991 Geographic Distribution of the Strength of Enforcement
Ranking (with raw scores per state)
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Fig. 14. 2009 Geographic Distribution of the Strength of Enforcement
Ranking (with raw scores per state)
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